



# ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
JAURÈSGASSE 3, 1030 VIENNA



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## Statement

by

**H.E. Ambassador Kazem Gharib Abadi**  
**Resident Representative to the IAEA**

Before

**the Board of Governors**

on

**Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East**

Vienna, September 2018

*In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful*

**Mr. Chairperson, Dear Colleagues,**

My delegation aligns itself with the statement of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) on this agenda item, delivered by distinguished Ambassador and Permanent Resident of Venezuela.

**Mr. Chairperson,**

Nuclear disarmament, as the fundamental objective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, remains the highest priority for the global community. Unfortunately, lack of real progress in the nuclear disarmament has been the main implementation challenge for the Treaty in the past nearly 50 years.

A lot has been said and done on the establishment of NWFZ in the Middle East in the past few decades; resolutions have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly since 1980, continuously without a vote, which represent the significance of the realization of this noble goal in the volatile region of the Middle East. Additionally, several initiatives were introduced in that vein, one of which was the 1974 initiative of Iran for the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, dating back to more that Forty years ago.

It is now a dominant view that as the most horrendous weapons ever developed, nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the very survival of humanity, and the only absolute guarantee against their threat or use is indeed their total elimination. The past failures are sources of grave concerns, be it the lack of willingness in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, or the disappointing implementation of the 2010 Plan of Action, or even the inability to reach a

consensus in the 2015 Review Conference. If we continue to fail to overcome this challenge, it continues to have its adverse impact on the very foundations, integrity, credibility and relevance of the Treaty.

Stressing the role and importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes, however, that they substitute neither other non-proliferation and safeguards measures, nor the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. such zones need to be established in other parts of the world, in particular in such a volatile region as the Middle East, where the unbridled reckless nuclear activities of the Israeli regime continue to threaten the region and beyond, not to name its nuclear weapons.

Stubborn opposition of the Israeli regime is, with no doubt, the only and main obstacle in the establishment of such a zone. However, the role of some powers in rendering blind support to the Israeli regime, in many instances, such as in convening the 2012 Conference and in preventing the adoption of the Final Document of the 2015 Review Conference, should not also be disregarded.

Therefore, while such supports need to be discontinued, the only way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is to exert and maintain a sustained pressure on Israel, by the international community of States, in order to compel it to accede, promptly and unconditionally as a non-nuclear weapon party, to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear activities and installations under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, as reaffirmed by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

Having ratified all major treaties banning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and determined to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and placing all its

nuclear facilities under the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that universal adherence to the NPT as well as the universal application of the IAEA safeguards, particularly in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the region.

Accordingly, we would like to once again reiterate our hope that by the accession of the State of Palestine as a State Party to the NPT and its initial steps to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, CSA would apply to all occupied territories of Palestine in due course.

**Mr. Chairperson,**

My delegation takes note of the Director General's report on "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East" (GOV/2018/38 and GC(62)6), where once again, it was reiterated that "All States of the Middle East region except for Israel are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and have undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency Safeguards." At the same time, my delegation expresses its deep regret that the Director General has not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate pursuant to resolution GC(61)/RES/14 regarding the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards covering all nuclear activities in the region of the Middle East, only because the Israeli regime is unjustifiably taking it hostage for legitimizing itself and addressing its so-called security concerns.

We would like to put on record, once again, as before, our strong reservation on the listing in the report, referring to the states of the Middle East region; also, in our view, this listing cannot be used in any other context or fora.

It is a very unpleasant and regretful situation that, in spite of the global attempts for establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, no progress has been made for its realization, and long-sought aspiration of the countries in the region has yet to be materialized, due to the non-adherence of Israeli regime to the NPT, and its refusal to place its unsafeguarded clandestine nuclear facilities under the IAEA verification system.

It is again a matter of regret and deep concern that this non-party to the NPT, confident of the political and military support of certain countries, continues to run its illegal underground nuclear military program, and has not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty, nor placed its secretive underground nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, and abandon its weapons of mass destruction program.

Such a ruthless deaf-and-dumb game played by the UN Security Council over the past several decades in addressing the well-documented nuclear weapons program of Israel, has given such an audacity to this regime to explicitly acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons, and even threaten its neighbors of its possible utilization.

**Mr. Chairperson,**

Maintaining the status quo is not an option anymore; protecting the Israeli regime, under illusive pretexts, from international condemnation, for its recalcitrant behavior vis-à-vis the Weapons of Mass Destruction Treaties, serves no longer the best interest of the Region and the International Community; the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action cannot be ignored or silenced by certain delegations, only to safeguard the interest of a non-party, which is materially endangering the peace and security of the region by developing a

clandestine nuclear weapon program and by not abiding the international call to adhere to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA Safeguards.

To this end, the only conceivable path for the maintenance of peace and security in the Region is through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the application of the IAEA Safeguards in the region. That is to say again that, the world powers cannot bury their heads in the sand, as if nothing is happening; If they really want to see peace and stability in the Region, they have to think practical, avoid grandiloquence and exert a sustained pressure on that regime to accede to the NPT, promptly and unconditionally, as a non-nuclear weapon party, and to place all of its underground nuclear activities and installations under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

**Thank you for your attention,**